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Abstract—We propose a practical methodology to protect a
user’s private data, when he wishes to publicly release data that
is correlated with his private data, in the hope of getting some
utility. Our approach relies on a general statistical inference
framework that captures the privacy threat under inference
attacks, given utility constraints. Under this framework, data is
distorted before it is released, according to a privacy-preserving
probabilistic mapping. This mapping is obtained by solving
a convex optimization problem, which minimizes information
leakage under a distortion constraint. We address practical
challenges encountered when applying this theoretical framework
to real world data. On one hand, the design of optimal privacy-
preserving mechanisms requires knowledge of the prior distribu-
tion linking private data and data to be released, which is often
unavailable in practice. On the other hand, the optimization may
become untractable and face scalability issues when data assumes
values in large size alphabets, or is high dimensional. Our
work makes three major contributions. First, we provide bounds
on the impact on the privacy-utility tradeoff of a mismatched
prior. Second, we show how to reduce the optimization size by
introducing a quantization step, and how to generate privacy
mappings under quantization. Third, we evaluate our method on
three datasets, including a new dataset that we collected, showing
correlations between political convictions and TV viewing habits.
We demonstrate that good privacy properties can be achieved
with limited distortion so as not to undermine the original
purpose of the publicly released data, e.g. recommendations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the many dangers of online privacy abuse
have surfaced, including identity theft, reputation loss, job
loss, discrimination, harassment, cyberbullying, stalking and
even suicide [1]–[3]. During the same time, many highly
visible privacy lawsuits have burst on the scene that typically
accuse online social network (OSN) providers of not properly
informing users about what their data is used for and whom
else gets access to it. We have seen lawsuits on illegal data
collection [4], sharing data without user consent [5], changing
privacy settings without informing users [6], misleading users
about tracking their browsing behavior [7], not carrying out
user deletion actions [8], and more. The potential cost of losing
these law suits is rising into the tens and hundreds of millions
of dollars [9], [10]. These events beg for academics to focus
more on bridging the divide between theoretical privacy and
practical issues of implementation.
One of the central problems of managing privacy in the
Internet lies in the simultaneous management of both public
and private data. Many users are willing to release some data
about themselves, such as their movie watching history or
their gender; they do so because such data enables useful
services and because such attributes are rarely considered
private. However users also have other data they consider
private, such as income level, political affiliation, or medical
conditions. In this work, we focus on a method in which
a user can release her public data, but is able to prevent
against inference attacks that may learn her private data from
the public information. Our solution consists of a privacy-
preserving mapping, which informs a user on how to distort
her public data, before releasing it, such that no inference
attacks can successfully learn her private data. At the same
time, the distortion should be bounded so that the original
service (such as a recommendation) can continue to be useful.
In this paper we adopt the privacy framework presented
in [11]. This general framework considers the privacy threat
incurred by a user when a passive adversary attempts to infer
the user’s private information from the user’s public (released)
data. The privacy loss is measured in terms of an inference cost
gain that the adversary has by observing the released data. The
goal of the framework is to determine a mapping of the public
data to a new set of outputs given certain distortion (utility)
constraints. The authors in [11] formulate the problem of
determining this mapping for a general inference cost function
as a convex program. Without significant loss of generality,
[11] argues that the privacy loss can be measured in terms
of mutual information, which leads to an optimization formu-
lation similar to the one found in rate-distortion theory. This
formulation, albeit general and theoretically sound, faces a
number of practical challenges when applied to actual datasets
available within web services. The first challenge is that
this method relies on knowing a joint probability distribution
Parts of this technical report were presented in IEEE GlobalSIP 2013 [12]
between the private and public data, called the prior. Often
the true prior distribution is not available and instead only
a limited set of samples of the private and public data can
be observed. This leads to the mismatched prior problem.
We seek to provide a meaningful distortion and bring privacy
even in the face of a mismatched prior. Our first contribution
centers around this. Starting with the set of observable data
samples, we find an improved estimate of the prior, based on
which the privacy-preserving mapping is derived. We develop
some bounds on any additional distortion this process incurs
to guarantee a given level of privacy. More precisely, we show
that the private information leakage increases log-linearly with
the L1-norm distance between our estimate and the prior; that
the distortion rate increases linearly with the L1-norm distance
between our estimate and the prior; and that the L1-norm
distance between our estimate and the prior decreases as the
sample size increases.
The second challenge is one of scalability that occurs when
the size of the underlying alphabet of the user data is very
large, e.g. due to a large number of features representing the
data. To handle this, we propose a quantization approach that
limits the dimensionality of the problem. We preprocess and
quantize the original data by clustering it. We then determine
how to distort the data in the space defined by the clusters.
The privacy-preserving mapping is computed using a convex
solver that minimizes privacy leakage subject to a distortion
constraint. The advantage of our quantization scheme is that
it is computationally efficient - we reduce the number of
optimized variables from being quadratic in the size of the
underlying feature alphabet to being quadratic in the number
of clusters, and thus make the optimization independent of
the number of observable data samples. For some real world
examples, this can lead to orders of magnitude reduction in
dimensionality. We also show that any additional distortion
introduced by quantization increases linearly with the max-
imum distance between a sample datapoint and the closest
cluster center. This quantization step, our second contribution,
provides a fundamental extension to the original method in
[11] which sometimes can not easily be applied in practice
when the data is too high dimensional.
Our third area of contribution centers around evaluations.
In [11] the authors only proposed and reasoned about their
framework but did not evaluate it. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our paper is the first evaluation of this method. We
evaluate our methods on 3 datasets, 2 well known datasets
and one new dataset that we collected ourselves. This latter
dataset is one that contains users TV show ratings and their
political affiliation. The Simmons National Consumer Survey
organization in the US has shown that correlations exist
between political affiliation and opinions about TV shows
[13]. In this case study, we consider TV show opinions to be
data to be released and a user’s political affiliation to be kept
private. The general framework of privacy against statistical
inference [11] allows for different kinds of instantiations of
data distortions before public release. For example, our system
might suggest to a user to simply remove an element of their
public data (called erasure-distortions), or may suggest to
alter the contents of some elements in a public profile (called
exchange-distortions), or other forms of distortion.
Our evaluations demonstrate multiple things. First, even
when we do not have a fully specified prior distribution on the
public and private distribution, we can still provide privacy. We
show that we can provide privacy in this difficult environment
at the extra cost of a small amount of additional distortion
in the public data. Second, we illustrate that our quantization
approach works well, namely that it is possible to provide
good privacy even when quantization is needed to reduce the
dimensionality of the data. Third, we show that in our Politics-
and-TV dataset, perfect privacy can be achieved with a 15%
distortion of the original public data. In practice less than 15%
distortion could provide sufficient privacy. We also illustrate
examples of specific distortions (changes to particular public
data profiles) and show these are intuitively reasonable, yet
not trivial.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section we formally define the problem at hand. In Section III
we provide bounds on the privacy-distortion tradeoff when the
mismatched prior problem surfaces. In Section IV, we explain
our method of quantization to address scalability challenges.
Our datasets are described in Section V, and the results of
our evaluation are provided in Section VI. We discuss related
work in Section VII, and conclude in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we define the threat model, and describe the
privacy-accuracy framework considered in this paper. Then,
we point out two challenges encountered when applying this
framework in practice, and outline our approaches to address
these challenges. These approaches are treated in more details
in Sections III and IV.
A. Notations
We denote by Simplex the probability simplex defined by∑
x p(x) = 1, p(x) ≥ 0 ∀x. Let A ∈ A and B ∈ B
be random vectors taking values in the alphabets A and B
respectively. The joint probability distribution of the elements
of A and B is denoted pA,B : A × B → [0, 1]. The
marginal distribution of vector A is defined by pA(a) =∑
b∈B pA,B(a, b) ∀a ∈ A, while the conditional distribution
of A given B is given by pA|B(a|b) = pA,B(a,b)pB(b) , where
support issues are handled accordingly. We may drop the
subscripts when the interpretation is clear from the context.
We recall the definitions of the entropy H(A) of a random
vector A, and of the mutual information I(A;B) of vectors
A and B:
H(A) = −
∑
a∈A
pA(a) log(pA(a))
I(A;B) =
∑
a∈A,b∈B
pA,B(a, b) log
(
pA,B(a, b)
pA(a)pB(b)
)
. (1)
Note that H(A) depends on the distribution of A only, while
I(A;B) depends only on the joint distribution pA,B of A and
B, since the marginals pA and pB can be obtained from the
joint distribution.
B. Threat Model
We consider the setting described in [11], where a user has
two types of data: some data that he would like to remain
private, e.g. his income level, his political views, etc., and
some data that he is willing to release publicly and from
which he will derive some utility, for example the release
of his media preferences to a service provider would allow
the user to receive content recommendations. We denote by
A ∈ A the vector of personal attributes that the user wants to
keep private, and by B ∈ B the vector of data he is willing to
make public, where A and B are the sets from which A and
B can assume values.
We assume that the user private attributes A are linked to
his data B by the joint probability distribution pA,B . Thus, an
adversary who would observe B could infer some information
about A from B.
To reduce this inference threat, instead of releasing B, the
user will release a distorted version of B, denoted Bˆ ∈ Bˆ,
generated according to a conditional probabilistic mapping
p
Bˆ|B , called the privacy-preserving mapping. Note that the
set Bˆ may differ from the set B.
The privacy-preserving mapping p
Bˆ|B should be designed
in such a way that it renders any statistical inference of A
based on the observation of Bˆ harder, yet, at the same time,
preserves some utility to the released data Bˆ, by limiting the
distortion generated by the mapping. This can be modeled by
a constraint ∆ ≥ 0 on the average distortion:
EB,Bˆ [d(B, Bˆ)] ≤ ∆, (2)
for some distortion metric d : B×Bˆ → R+. It should be noted
that any distortion metric can be used, such as the Hamming
distance if B and Bˆ are binary vectors, or the l2-norm if B and
Bˆ are real vectors, or even more complex metrics modeling the
variation in utility that a user would derive from the release
of Bˆ instead of B. The latter could, for example, represent
the difference in the quality of content recommended to the
user based on the release of his distorted media preferences
Bˆ instead of his true preferences B.
We now formalize the privacy threat model. We assume
the following standard statistical inference threat model [11]:
the adversary chooses a belief on the data A, modeled by
a probability distribution q : A → [0, 1]. The belief q is
obtained by minimizing an expected cost function C(A, q).
In particular, prior to observing Bˆ, the adversary chooses
his inference method (i.e. belief) q as the solution of the
minimization
c∗0 = min
q
EA[C(A, q)].
After observing Bˆ, the adversary updates his inference method
q such that it minimizes
c∗
bˆ
= min
q
EA|Bˆ[C(A, q)|Bˆ = bˆ].
Algorithm 1 Privacy preserving mapping.
Input: prior pA,B
solve the problem for p
Bˆ|B:
minimize
p
Bˆ|B
J(pA,B, pBˆ|B)
subject to Ep
B,Bˆ
[
d(B, Bˆ)
]
≤ ∆
p
Bˆ|B ∈ Simplex
Output: mapping p
Bˆ|B
The average cost gain by the adversary after observing the
public release Bˆ is the difference
∆C = c∗0 − EBˆ [c
∗
bˆ
].
This average cost gain represents how much an adversary gains
in term of inference of the private attributes A thanks to the
observation of Bˆ. The goal of the privacy-preserving mapping
will be to minimize this gain. In the particular case of perfect
privacy ∆C = 0, the released data Bˆ does not provide any
information that is helpful for the inference of A, and the
inference cannot outperform an uninformed guess. Note that
this general framework does not assume a particular inference
algorithm.
If an adversary uses the log-loss1 cost function C(A, q) =
− log(qA), it can easily be shown [11] that
∆C = I(A; Bˆ). (3)
Hence, the privacy leakage is captured by the mutual informa-
tion between the private attributes A and the publicly released
data Bˆ. It should be noted that in the case of perfect privacy
(I(A; Bˆ) = 0), the privacy-preserving mapping p
Bˆ|B renders
the released data Bˆ statistically independent from the private
data A.
It should be mentioned that, although we model the pri-
vacy threat using the average cost gain ∆C in this paper,
Calmon and Fawaz [11] also proposed a worst-case model
∆C∗ = c∗0−minbˆ∈B c
∗
bˆ
, where the privacy threat is measured
in terms of the most informative output, i.e. the output that
gives the largest gain in cost. We would like to point out
that in the case of perfect privacy under the log-loss, the
average threat model ∆C = 0 and the worst-case threat model
∆C∗ = 0 are equivalent. Thus conclusions drawn on distortion
to achieve perfect privacy under the average threat model also
hold for the worst-case model. In general, the worst-case threat
is an upperbound on the average threat, and its analysis and
application are the object of some of our ongoing work.
C. Privacy-Accuracy Framework
In this section, we describe how the privacy-preserving
mapping is designed to address the inference privacy threat,
1For a justification of the relevance and generality of the log-loss cost, we
refer the reader to [11, Section IV.A].
under a constraint on the distortion.
The mutual information I(A; Bˆ) is a function of the joint
distribution pA,Bˆ, which in turn depends on both the prior
distribution pA,B and the privacy-preserving mapping pBˆ|B.
Indeed, A→ B → Bˆ form a Markov chain, thus
p
A,Bˆ
(a, bˆ) =
∑
b∈B
p
Bˆ|B(bˆ|b)pA,B(a, b),
p
Bˆ
(bˆ) =
∑
b∈B
p
Bˆ|B(bˆ|b)pB(b), (4)
and using Eq. (4) in the definition of I(A; Bˆ), we can write
I(A; Bˆ) =
∑
a,b,bˆ
pA,B(a, b)pBˆ|B(bˆ|b) log
∑
b” p(bˆ|b”)p(b”|a)∑
a′,b′ p(bˆ|b
′)p(a′, b′)
.
(5)
To stress the dependency of the privacy leakage on the
prior distribution and the privacy-preserving mapping, we will
denote
I(A; Bˆ) = J(pA,B, pBˆ|B).
Similarly, the average distortion E
B,Bˆ
[d(B, Bˆ)] is a function
of the joint distribution pB,Bˆ, which in turn depends both on
the prior distribution pA,B , through the marginal pB , and on
the privacy-preserving mapping p
Bˆ|B.
Consequently, given a prior distribution pA,B linking the
private attributes A and the data B, the privacy-preserving
mapping p
Bˆ|B minimizing the privacy leakage subject to a
distortion constraint is obtained as the solution to the opti-
mization problem
minimize
p
Bˆ|B
J(pA,B, pBˆ|B)
subject to EB,Bˆ[d(B, Bˆ)] ≤ ∆
p
Bˆ|B ∈ Simplex.
(6)
It was shown in [11] that this problem is convex, and can
thus be efficiently solved using standard algorithms. Note
that this problem bears some resemblance with a modified
rate distortion problem. This optimization is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
D. Practical Challenges
In this section, we describe two practical challenges encoun-
tered when applying the theoretical privacy-accuracy frame-
work described in Section II-C.
Mismatched prior: Finding the privacy-preserving
mapping as the solution to the convex optimization in
Algorithm 1 relies on the fundamental assumption that the
prior distribution pA,B that links private attributes A and data
B is known and can be fed as an input to the algorithm.
In practice, the true prior distribution may not be known,
but may rather be estimated from a set of sample data that
can be observed, for example from a set of users who do
not have privacy concerns and publicly release both their
attributes A and their original data B. The prior estimated
based on this set of samples from non-private users is then
used to design the privacy-preserving mechanism that will
be applied to new users, who are concerned about their
privacy. In practice, there may exist a mismatch between the
estimated prior and the true prior, due for example to a small
number of observable samples, or to the incompleteness
of the observable data. In Section III, we characterize the
actual privacy-accuracy tradeoff that results from first running
Algorithm 1 with a mismatched prior as input, and then using
the so-obtained privacy-preserving mapping, instead of the
mapping that would have been obtained under the knowledge
of the true prior.
Large Data: Designing the privacy-preserving mapping
p
Bˆ|B requires characterizing the value of pBˆ|B(bˆ|b) for all
possible pairs (b, bˆ) ∈ B×Bˆ, i.e. solving the convex optimiza-
tion problem over |B||Bˆ| variables. When Bˆ = B, and the size
of the alphabet |B| is large, solving the convex optimization
over |B|2 variables may become intractable. In Section IV,
we propose a method based on quantization to reduce the
number of optimization variables. We show that this method
to reduce complexity does not affect the privacy levels that can
be achieved, but comes at the expense of a limited amount of
additional distortion, that we characterize.
III. PRIVACY IN THE FACE OF MISMATCHED PRIOR
Suppose that we do not have perfect knowledge of the
true prior distribution pA,B but that we have its estimate
qA,B . Then, if qA,B is a good estimate of pA,B, the solution
p∗
Bˆ|B
obtained by feeding the mismatched distribution qA,B
as an input to the optimization problem (6) should be close
to the one with pA,B . In particular, the information leakage
J(qA,B, p
∗
Bˆ|B
) and distortion due to the mapping p∗
Bˆ|B
, with
respect to the mismatched prior qA,B should be similar to the
actual leakage J(pA,B, p∗Bˆ|B) and distortion with respect to
the true prior pA,B. This claim is formalized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let p∗
Bˆ|B
be a solution to the optimization
problem (6) with qA,B . Then:∣∣∣J(pA,B, p∗Bˆ|B)− J(qA,B, p∗Bˆ|B)
∣∣∣
≤ 3 ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 log
|A| |B|
‖pA,B − qA,B‖1
Ep
Bˆ,B
[
d(Bˆ, B)
]
≤ ∆+ dmax ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1
where dmax = maxbˆ,b d(bˆ, b) is the maximum distance in thefeature space.
The following lemma [14], which bounds the difference in
the entropies of two distributions, will be useful in the proof
of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 ( [14, Thm 17.3.3]). Let p and q be distributions
with the same support X such that ‖p− q‖1 ≤
1
2 . Then:
|H(p)−H(q)| ≤ ‖p− q‖1 log
|X |
‖p− q‖1
.
Proof of Theorem 1: The first inequality can be proved in
four steps. Initially, we note that the objective function can be
rewritten as
J(pA,B, pBˆ|B) = H(pA) +H(pBˆ)−H(pA,Bˆ). (7)
Therefore, the difference between the objective functions with
respect to pA,B and qA,B is bounded as:
∣∣∣J(pA,B, pBˆ|B)− J(qA,B, pBˆ|B)
∣∣∣ (8)
≤ |H(pA)−H(qA)| +
|H(p
Bˆ
)−H(q
Bˆ
)| +
|H(pA,Bˆ)−H(qA,Bˆ)|.
The bound in Lemma 1 can be used to bound each of the
terms in Equation (8). For instance:
∥∥∥pA,Bˆ − qA,Bˆ
∥∥∥
1
=
∑
a,bˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
b
p(bˆ|b)[p(a, b)− q(a, b)]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a,b,bˆ
p(bˆ|b) |p(a, b)− q(a, b)|
=
∑
a,b
∑
bˆ
p(bˆ|b)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
|p(a, b)− q(a, b)|
= ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 (9)
and therefore:
|H(pA,Bˆ)−H(qA,Bˆ)| (10)
≤ ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 log
|A| |B|
‖pA,B − qA,B‖1
.
Similarly, it can be shown that:
|H(pA)−H(qA)| (11)
≤ ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 log
|A|
‖pA,B − qA,B‖1
|H(p
Bˆ
)−H(q
Bˆ
)| (12)
≤ ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 log
|B|
‖pA,B − qA,B‖1
.
Finally, the three upper bounds can be substituted into Equa-
tion (8), which yields:
∣∣∣J(pA,B, pBˆ|B)− J(qA,B, pBˆ|B)
∣∣∣ (13)
≤ 3 ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 log
|A| |B|
‖pA,B − qA,B‖1
.
Our first claim is proved by substituting p∗
Bˆ|B
for p
Bˆ|B in the
above equation.
The proof of our second claim is based on the following
inequality:∣∣∣Ep
Bˆ,B
[
d(Bˆ, B)
]
− Eq
Bˆ,B
[
d(Bˆ, B)
]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a,b,bˆ
p(bˆ|b)[p(a, b)− q(a, b)]d(b, bˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a,b,bˆ
p(bˆ|b)d(b, bˆ) |p(a, b)− q(a, b)|
≤ dmax
∑
a,b
∑
bˆ
p(bˆ|b)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
|p(a, b)− q(a, b)|
= dmax ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 . (14)
Based on this observation, it follows that:
Ep
Bˆ,B
[
d(Bˆ, B)
]
≤ Eq
Bˆ,B
[
d(Bˆ, B)
]
+
dmax ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1
≤ ∆+ dmax ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 . (15)
The last step is due to the constraint Eq
Bˆ,B
[
d(Bˆ, B)
]
≤ ∆
that is enforced in our problem (6). This concludes our proof.
Finally, we provide a bound on the probability of
‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 being large, when qA,B is simply the em-
pirical distribution obtained from counting on n samples.
Proposition 1. Let qA,B be empirical distribution of pA,B:
qA,B(a, b) =
#{ai = a, bi = b}
n
where n is the total number of samples, and #{ai = a, bi = b}
is the number of examples where A = a and B = b. Then
P(‖qA,B − pA,B‖1 ≥ ε) ≤ (n+ 1)
|A||B|2−2nǫ
2
Proof: By Pinsker’s Inequality, we get :
ǫ ≤ ‖pA,B − qA,B‖1 ≤
√
1
2
D(pA,B‖qA,B) (16)
which implies that D(pA,B‖qA,B) ≥ 2ǫ2. We now combine
this with Sanov’s Theorem to directly obtain the desired
bound:
P(‖qA,B − pA,B‖1 > ε) ≤ (n+ 1)
|A||B|2−D(pA,B‖qA,B)
(17)
≤ (n+ 1)|A||B|2−2nǫ
2 (18)
Therefore, as the sample size n increases, the probability of
having a poor empirical estimator of the true distribution in
terms of L1-norm decreases with rate (n+ 1)|A||B|2−2nǫ
2
Discrete
data
Probability
estimation Quantization
Convex Op-
timization
Optimal
Privacy
Mapping
pA,B pA,C pCˆ|C
Fig. 1: The quantization approach for large alphabets
IV. PRIVACY FOR LARGE DATA
In real-world datasets, the alphabet B is often large. In
particular, the number of symbols in the alphabet B observed
in the available dataset may be θ(n), linear in the number
of samples n in the dataset. Suppose that Bˆ = B. Then the
number of optimized variables in Problem (6) is θ(n2). Note
that the distortion constraint is linear in p
Bˆ|B(bˆ | b) , but
the objective function is neither linear nor quadratic. As a
result, the optimization problem (6) cannot be solved using
fast linear or quadratic programming solvers. In general, the
problem is hard to solve when the size of alphabet B exceeds
a few hundreds symbols.
To address this issue, we show how to solve our problem
approximately by optimizing fewer variables. Our method
comprises three steps. First, a quantization [15] step maps
the symbols in alphabet B to |C| representative examples in
a smaller alphabet C. Second, we learn a privacy-preserving
mapping q
Cˆ|C on the new alphabet, where Cˆ = C. Third,
the symbols in B are mapped to the representative examples
Cˆ based on the learned mapping q
Cˆ|C . Our approach is
summarized in Algorithm 2 and Diagram 1.
Our solution has several notable properties. To begin with,
the privacy-preserving mapping q
Cˆ|C is learned on the reduced
alphabet C. Thus, we need to solve the convex optimiza-
tion (6) for only |C||Cˆ| variables instead of |B||Bˆ|. In practice,
|C| ≪ |B| and this results in major computational savings.
Second, quantization and privacy-preserving optimization are
done separately. Therefore, any quantization method can be
easily combined with our approach. In particular, we can
minimize the quantization error in the quantization step, and
then our privacy mechanism guarantees the optimal mapping
in terms of additional distortion. Finally, quantization ob-
viously yields a suboptimal privacy-accuracy tradeoff, since
the quantization step is an additional source of distortion.
However, in Theorem 2, we quantify how quantization affects
the privacy-accuracy tradeoff, and show that the levels of
privacy that can be achieved are not affected, but come at
the expense of a bounded amount of distortion.
In the rest of this section, we analyze Algorithm 2. Algo-
rithm 2 essentially solves the following variant of problem
(6):
minimize
p
Cˆ|C
J(qA,C , pCˆ|C) (19)
subject to: Ep
C,Cˆ
[
d(C, Cˆ)
]
≤ ∆
p
Cˆ|C ∈ Simplex;
where alphabets B and Bˆ are substituted for alphabets C and Cˆ,
and the joint probability distribution over A and C is defined
as
qA,C(a, c) =
∑
b∼c
pA,B(a, b), (20)
where b ∼ c means that the symbol b is in the cluster
represented by center c. The above equation aggregates the
probability mass of all symbols in the cluster in its center.
The symbols in B are mapped to Cˆ according to
p
Cˆ|B(cˆ | b) = qCˆ|C(cˆ | ψ(b)), (21)
where ψ : B → C is a function that maps a symbol in B to
a cluster center in C. Note that the probability distributions
that are associated with optimization (19) are marked by q.
We now prove our main claim.
Theorem 2. Let q
Cˆ|C be a solution to problem (19) and
p
Cˆ|B be the corresponding mapping from B (Equation 21).
Moreover, let C be an alphabet such that max
b∈B
min
c∈C
d(b, c) ≤ r.
Then the privacy leakage J(pA,B, pCˆ|B) of the mapping pCˆ|B
is equal to the value of the objective function of (19):
J(pA,B, pCˆ|B) = J(qA,C , qCˆ|C),
and its total distortion rate is no more than r larger than the
target ∆:
Ep
B,Cˆ
[
d(B, Cˆ)
]
≤ ∆+ r.
Proof: The information-leakage equality can be proved
as follows. First, both J(pA,B, qCˆ|B) and J(qA,C , qCˆ|C) can
be rewritten as
J(pA,B, qCˆ|B) = H(pA) +H(pCˆ)−H(pA,Cˆ) (22)
J(qA,C , qCˆ|C) = H(qA) +H(qCˆ)−H(qA,Cˆ), (23)
where
p(a, cˆ) =
∑
b
q(cˆ|ψ(b))p(a, b) (24)
q(a, cˆ) =
∑
c
q(cˆ|c)q(a, c). (25)
Second, note that
p(a, cˆ) =
∑
b
q(cˆ|ψ(b))p(a, b)
=
∑
c
q(cˆ|c)
∑
b∼c
p(a, b)
=
∑
c
q(cˆ|c)q(a, c)
= q(a, cˆ). (26)
So the two distributions are identical. Thus H(pA,Cˆ) =
H(qA,Cˆ), and an analogous result holds for the entropies of
the marginals. As a result, the privacy leakage of the mapping
q
Cˆ|B on B is equal to the privacy leakage of the mapping qCˆ|C
on C.
The distortion inequality is proved as follows. First, note
that (21) implies
q
B,Cˆ
(b, cˆ) =
∑
a
q
Cˆ|B(cˆ|b)pA,B(a, b)
=
∑
a
q
Cˆ|C(cˆ|ψ(b))pA,B(a, b). (27)
Based on this equality, we can bound the distortion as
Eq
B,Cˆ
[
d(B, Cˆ)
]
=
∑
b,cˆ
q(b, cˆ)d(b, cˆ)
=
∑
a,b,cˆ
q(cˆ|ψ(b))p(a, b)d(b, cˆ)
=
∑
a,c,cˆ
q(cˆ|c)
∑
b∼c
p(a, b)d(b, cˆ)
≤
∑
a,c,cˆ
q(cˆ|c)
∑
b∼c
p(a, b)[d(b, c) + d(c, cˆ)]
=
∑
a,c,cˆ
q(cˆ|c)
∑
b∼c
p(a, b)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q(a,c)
d(c, cˆ) +
∑
a,c
∑
cˆ
q(cˆ|c)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
∑
b∼c
p(a, b)d(b, ψ(b))
≤ Eq
C,Cˆ
[
d(C, Cˆ)
]
+ r
∑
a,b
p(a, b)
≤ ∆+ r. (28)
This concludes our proof.
Theorem 2 states that the information leakage of the map-
ping p
Cˆ|B is the same as that of the optimized mapping qCˆ|C .
So we optimize the quantity of interest J(pA,B, pCˆ|B) in a
time which is independent of the size of the input alphabet
B. The total distortion increases due to quantization, linearly
with the maximum distance r between any example b and its
closest representative example ψ(b).
The maximum distance r can be minimized by existing
quantization techniques, e.g. online k-center clustering [16]
and cover trees [17]. Both methods quantize data nearly
optimally. In particular, if the minimum quantization error by
|C| examples is r∗, then the maximum error produced by these
methods is 8r∗. Note that finding |C| examples that minimize
the quantization error is NP hard.
V. DATASETS
In order to evaluate our framework, we apply it to three
datasets. The first two datasets, the Census data [18] and Iris
data [19] are well-known publicly available datasets. The third
one, called Politics-and-TV, is a dataset on political convic-
tions and TV preferences, that we collected by conducting a
survey, as explained in Section V-C.
Algorithm 2 Quantized privacy preserving mapping.
Input: prior pA,B
for all (a, c) ∈ (A, C) do
qA,C(a, c)←
∑
b∼c pA,B(a, b)
end for
solve the convex optimization problem over p
Cˆ|C :
minimize
p
Cˆ|C
J(qA,C , pCˆ|C)
subject to Ep
C,Cˆ
[
d(C, Cˆ)
]
≤ ∆
p
Cˆ|C ∈ Simplex;
return optimal solution q
Cˆ|C
for all (b, cˆ) ∈ (B, Cˆ) do
p
Cˆ|B(cˆ|b)← qCˆ|C(cˆ|ψ(c))
end for
Output: mapping p
Cˆ|B
These three datasets were selected because each allows us to
illustrate different components of our work. We use the Census
dataset to illustrate the basic performance of Algorithm 1.
We evaluate Algorithm 2 on both the Iris and Politics-and-TV
datasets. We start with the Iris data because it is a simple low
dimensional dataset that allows us to visualize the effect of our
proposed distortion techniques. The Politics-and-TV data has
a high-dimensional alphabet and thus allows us to evaluate
how quantization influences our ability to provide privacy.
The Census and Politics-and-TV datasets have data that lie
in discrete sets, while the Iris dataset has continuous entries.
We present the optimal privacy-accuracy curve for each case,
and give some insights on the privacy mappings.
A. Census Dataset
The Census dataset is a well studied dataset in the Machine
Learning community. Based on the 1994 Census, the dataset
is a sample of the United States population, and contains
both categoric and numerical features. More precisely, for
each entry in the dataset, there are features such as age,
workclass, education, gender, and native country, as well as
income category (smaller or larger than 50k per year). For our
purposes, we consider the information to be released publicly
as the education, gender, and age, while the income category
is the private information to be protected. It is noteworthy to
know that about 76% of the people in the dataset have an
income smaller than 50k.
Our privacy mechanism in this case uses erasures. Erasure
policies are ones in which we advise a user how to modify
their public profile before it is released, by erasing 1, 2 or 3
pieces of information, in order to make it hard to infer income
category.
The suggestion is tailored to each individual.
The joint probability distribution pA,B is estimated over
the available data. Because of the discrete nature of the data,
the low dimension of the feature space considered, and the
large number of available observations (about 50,000 entries),
the joint distribution can be estimated easily with very high
confidence. In this case, there is essentially no prior mismatch.
B. Iris Dataset
The Iris dataset has been used by the Machine Learning
community extensively [19]. The dataset consists of four nu-
merical attributes (petal length in cm, petal width in cm, sepal
length in cm, and sepal width in cm) and one class attribute
(Iris Setosa, Iris Versicolour, Iris Virginica) that identifies the
particular category of Iris flower. There are 50 samples per
class, for a total of 150 samples. It has been shown that
using the 4 numerical attributes, it is possible to build very
good classifiers to identify the type of Iris flower [20]. We
can visualize this by projecting the 4 numerical values on
2 principal components (see Fig. 2), which explain 97% of
the variance. It is straightforward to see that the three flower
classes are almost linearly separable in this space. We also
see that the Iris Setosa has attributes that differentiate it much
better, whereas there might be some confusion between the Iris
Versicolour, and Iris Virginica. However, we again emphasize
the fact that even though the latter two flowers are close in
this space, the classifiers’ accuracy is still very good (between
80% and 100% accuracy).
Because of the continuous nature of the data, we consider
kernel based tools to estimate the joint probability distribution.
Our prior distribution may hence be slightly mismatched
compared to the true prior.
C. Politics and Media Dataset
The Politics-and-TV dataset gathers data on political con-
victions and TV preferences of viewers in the USA in Fall
2012. The collection of such data was motivated by large scale
surveys such as [13], [21], which illustrated that the audiences
for a number of TV shows can be distinctly characterized.
Opinion polls have also published articles in the press with
lists of top-10 or 20 TV shows that are most indicative
of political affiliation. For example, The Colbert Report is
predominantly watched by Democrats, whereas Fox News
and Swamp Loggers are primarily watched by Republicans.
We thus started from the premise that it is possible to use
public information about a user’s TV preferences, such as
the list and ratings of TV shows he watches, to infer some
private information, namely political convictions. It should be
noted that fewer than 1% of Facebook users disclose their
political views in their public profile, which seems to indicate
that political convictions are deemed private information. We
describe hereafter the data collection process, and our dataset.
Data Collection: We designed a survey that users take vol-
untarily. In our survey, users were first asked to provide
demographic information (gender, age group, state they live in)
as well as their political convictions (Democrat, Republican).
Then users were asked to complete a sequence of 6 panels,
each panel presenting the user with 6-8 TV shows of a certain
genre, namely Sitcoms, Reality Shows, TV series, Talk Shows,
News, and Sports, for a total of 50 TV shows. Users were
asked to rate only those TV shows that they watched on
a scale from 1 to 5— the usual star rating system. After
providing their ratings, users were shown, for each genre,
how their ratings compared with the average ratings given
by Democrats and Republicans. In our privacy policy, users
were informed that no private information that can be used to
identify an individual was stored— we did not store cookies,
nor IP addresses, etc. Thus the data collected is by consenting
users.
We ran our survey in two phases. In phase 1 (October
2012), we ran it on Mechanical Turk requesting only US-
based workers. An initial experiment revealed that 80% of
users completing the survey were Democrats. To diminish
this bias, we reran the survey in two batches. For the first
batch, we limited the user pool to Democrats only, and in
the second batch we limited it to Republicans only. This
mechanism helped although it still did not produce equal
numbers of Democrats and Republicans. In total, we obtained
854 surveys, with 518 Democrats and 336 Republicans. In
phase 2 (November 2012), we launched our survey on the
public web at www.PoliticsandMedia.org. We drove traffic
to the survey website by running advertising campaigns on
MyLikes.com and Google AdWords, shortly before the U.S.
2012 presidential election. From this, we obtained another 364
completed surveys, with 226 Democrats and 138 Republicans.
We conducted this survey in two places (Mechanical Turk and
the Web) to create more diversity of users in our survey. An
advantage of the Mechanical Turk approach is that users are
incentivized to properly complete the survey. We threw out
surveys which were clearly never finished, e.g. no ratings, and
the numbers above reflect the final retained surveys.
Dataset: The dataset contains entries for 1,218
users, broken into 744 Democrats, and 474
Republicans. For each user, the dataset entry is a
vector [age, gender, state, politics, r1, . . . ...r50] where
ri ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 5} is the user’s star rating for show i if the
user rated the show, and 0 otherwise. The 5 most watched
TV shows are The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, The Colbert
Report, NFL, The Big Bang Theory, and Family Guy. Figure 3
shows the demographics of the 1,218 users in the dataset.
In the sequel, we will consider two versions of the rating
vector: the 5-star rating vector R ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 5}50, and the
binarized rating vector B ∈ {0, 1}50. The binarized rating bi
of show i is obtained by setting bi = 1 if the original rating
ri >= 4 clearly indicating that the user likes the show, and
bi = 0 otherwise.
VI. RESULTS
A. Baseline Convex optimization on Census Dataset
We demonstrate here a direct application of the convex
optimization approach Algorithm-1 described earlier on the
Census dataset. This can be seen as a simple application
as we do not need to apply a quantization step. For this
dataset, we will use the erasure-distortion approach meaning
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Fig. 4: Census data: Privacy Distortion
curve
that our proposed distortion to an individual’s public data (age,
education, and gender) may be to remove a subset of features.
In this way, we distort without lying, and our distortion metric
is the number of erasures.
Formally, let B(u) = (b1, b2, b3, a) be the features of
user u, where b1 ∈ {male, female}, b2 ∈ {young, adult,
old} and b3 ∈ {high-school, college degree, master degree,
doctorate}. The feature a is the private attribute defined
as a ∈ {high, low} where high/low refers to an income
above/below 50K$ respectively. In this case the output
alphabet Bˆ after the privacy mapping is larger than the input
alphabet B as each feature can be replaced by an erasure.
Because of the mapping restriction p
bˆ|b can have non zero
values if b and bˆ differ only in positions where bˆ has an
erasure. We define the distortion metric d(bˆ, b) as the number
of erasures in bˆ, when b and bˆ match in non-erasure positions
and d(bˆ, b) =∞ otherwise.
We have tested the algorithm for different distortion con-
straint values and obtained the privacy-distortion curve shown
in Fig. 4. The y-axis captures the privacy leakage measured
by the mutual information. The x-axis quantifies the distortion
in terms of average number of erasures. Without any of
our distortions (0 erasures), the privacy leakage, or mutual
information, is 0.142 bits. If, on average, we erase one of
the three features in these user profiles, then the privacy
leakage drops to roughly 0.025 bits. This can be interpreted
as requiring an adversary to ask many more questions in
order to learn the private information. Perfect privacy (mutual
information is zero) is obtained when the expected erasures is
1.5 features (out of three). This confirms that gender, age and
education are related to one’s income.
Since the privacy-distortion curve alone does not provide
much insight on the privacy mapping, we have represented
some specific case of mappings in Table 5. It is interesting to
see that some different categories get mapped to an identical
vector, for example, row 2 and row 5 are both mapped to
‘male’ with 2 erasures. This illustrates the confusion created
by our distortions; an adversary that sees such an output
cannot determine its original form, and will likely learn next
to nothing about these individuals incomes.
B. Mismatched prior and quantization on Iris data
Recall that the Iris dataset has a slightly mismatched prior
and the privacy goal is to make it hard to classify the
Iris Virginica flower correctly. Intuitively we can do this by
blurring the distinction between the Virginica and Versicolour
flowers; yet this needs to be done without diminishing the
ability to correctly classify the Setosa flower. This simple
example will allow us to directly compare the effect of quan-
tization by running both Algorithm-1 (without quantization)
and Algorithm-2 (with quantization) on this data.
Let the private attribute be a ∈ {not Virginica, Virginica},
and our observed behavior B be the petal and sepal, length
and width attributes. Because these features are continuous, we
estimate the probability density p(A,B) using a gaussian ker-
nel estimator, with bandwidth fitted through cross-validation,
for each set of flower. We have therefore an estimate of the
conditional densities fB|A for each A. We further sample
the distribution to derive a discrete approximation of the
joint density pA,B that is needed for our convex optimization
problem. In this case, we use the L2-norm as the distortion
metric. This is a natural distortion metric for any optimizations
seeking to minimize a squared error.
We tried different quantization granularities, obtained by ap-
plying the traditional k-means clustering method and changing
the number of clusters. The privacy leakage versus distortion
tradeoff is shown Fig. 8. The curve labeled “No Quantization”
was obtained using Algorithm-1, whereas the others were
generated using Algorithm-2 for different values of k the
number of clusters. We see that using 50 clusters is nearly
identical to the behavior without quantization. This is a first
confirmation that our quantization approach is sound. Further-
more, even quantization with 15 clusters achieves a privacy-
distortion tradeoff that is quite similar to the tradeoff incurred
Original features Private mapping
< 50k male young College degree male - -
N male adult College degree - adult College degree
< 50k male young High School male - High school
N male adult High School male - High School
< 50k female young High School - - -
< 50k female young College degree - - -
> 50k male adult Masters degree male - -
< 50k female adult College degree - adult College degree
Fig. 5: Most probable mapping for the Top 8 categories in the Census Dataset. Initially some set of attributes may be highly
correlated with income (denoted by < 50k and > 50k), or be more neutral (denoted by N).
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Fig. 6: Iris data: Each point represents a
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curves, one for each level of quantiza-
tion.
when no quantization is used. This is very encouraging as
it indicates that quantization does not penalize the mapping
in any substantive way. For example, consider the mutual
information of 0.03. For this level of privacy, we introduce an
amount of distortion equal to 0.18. However if we introduce
clustering to improve on computation complexity, then we
need a somewhat larger distortion of 0.21 to achieve the
same level of privacy. This is a small penalty since clustering
reduces the number of input variables used in the privacy-
accuracy optimization which, in turn, reduces the overall
complexity of determining the optimal privacy mapping. This
illustrates how clustering can make the privacy-distortion
optimization significantly more tractable without incurring a
large penalty in terms of distortion.
We show the privacy mapping in Fig. ??. Each point on
these curves represents a cluster, and the arrow illustrates
the suggested new value (i.e. distortion) that our mapping
determines. For low levels of distortion (top plot) the clusters
on the left, containing the Iris Setosa flowers, are barely
distorted. For the higher distortion level, all of the clusters
are distorted. We can see that the distinction between the blue
and green clusters has grown more blurred, while the Setosa
flower clusters on the left still remain clearly separable from
the others, allowing their correct classification. This validates
the fact that while we distort the data in order to provide
privacy, it can still be used for some (approved) inference
purposes.
C. Mismatched prior and quantization on Politics-and-TV
Data
We demonstrate here a more realistic privacy preservation
application over the Politics-and-TV dataset described earlier.
Consider the setting where a user wishes to release his
TV show ratings R ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 5}50 (or B ∈ {0, 1}50),
in the hope of getting good recommendations, but is con-
cerned about them leaking information about his political
affiliation A ∈ {Democrat,Republican}. Note that although
we focus on the case where the private data is a single
variable representing political affiliation, the privacy-accuracy
framework [11] can handle protecting a set of private variables,
e.g. we could protect any subset of a user’s three attributes
[age,gender, politics]. The rating vector R (reps. B) lives in
a large alphabet of size 650 (resp. 250)2. Solving (??) over
6100 variables would be untractable, and justifies resorting
to quantization. In this section, we first describe the privacy
2The number of survey samples is small relative to the size of the alphabet,
and estimating the prior pA,R from the dataset may lead to a mismatched
prior. We address the issue of the mismatched prior in [?].
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Fig. 10: Politics & TV data: Privacy-
accuracy trade-off on binarized ratings
after quantization. Quantization intro-
duces most of the distortion.
0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.8
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
M
u
tu
al
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Expected L2 distortion per rating
Fig. 11: Politics & TV data: Privacy-
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
 
 
actual ratings
binarized ratings
distorted ratings ∆ = 1
distorted ratings ∆ = 2
TP
R
FPR
Fig. 12: Politics & TV data: ROC curve
of a logistic regression classifier for the
political affiliation based on TV show
ratings
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
R
at
in
gs
DDDDDDDDDD RRRRRRRRRR
Mo
dern
Fam
ily
Com
mu
nity Gle
e
The
Me
nta
list
The
Dai
ly S
how
O’R
eilly
Fac
tor
FOX
New
s
NB
C N
ew
s
NB
A
Nas
car
Fig. 9: Box plots of ratings for 12 TV shows by Democrats
(D) and Republicans (R)
threat on political affiliation from the release of TV show
ratings, then we characterize the privacy-accuracy trade-off
under quantization. We illustrate the success of our privacy
approach by showing how an inference algorithm degrades
down to an uninformed guess at perfect privacy. Finally, we
compare the quality of recommendations based on the actual
user ratings versus the privatized ratings.
Privacy threat: The threat comes from the underlying exis-
tence of TV shows that are highly correlated with political
affiliation, e.g. The Daily Show is predominantly liked by
Democrats, while Fox News is preferred by Republicans. Fig.
9 shows boxplots of ratings for 12 shows—two shows from
each genre in the dataset— by Democrats and Republicans.
Those shows for which there is little overlap in the opinions
of Republicans and Democrats clearly demonstrate high corre-
lation between political affiliation and opinion of those shows.
Such shows have high discriminative power that inference
algorithms can exploit. There exists a broad variety of shows
in terms of their discriminative power - some are very much
so, while others exhibit low correlation. Users who rate highly
shows such as The O’Reilly Factor, or The Daily Show, may
be facing a stronger threat than those who only watch and
rate shows with little discriminating power. Broadly speaking,
across our 50 shows, we found that roughly one third of them
have strong correlation with political affiliation.
In order to understand the threat inherent in this dataset, we
quantify the potential privacy leakage using mutual informa-
tion I(A;R).
To provide an illustrative example, we thus consider a
reduced set of our data for which we can compute the mutual
information. We consider the top 5 most seen TV shows, and
use the binarized version of the rating vector with ratings in
{0, 1}5. For this case, we observe that the mutual information
between the observed features and the political orientation is
already at 0.191 bits. An adversary, with this information on
hand (the 5 tuple of binarized ratings), could use a maximum
a posteriori (MAP) detector and guess the political affiliation
of somebody with an accuracy of 71%. Hence, the privacy
threat is real. Note that because mutual information is a non-
decreasing function, as we add additional shows, the threat
either stays the same or increases.
Privacy-accuracy trade-off: We now apply our quantization
approach and investigate its impact on the privacy-distortion
tradeoff. We first consider the full dataset (all 50 shows)
with the binarized version of the ratings. For this scenario
we use an exchange-distortion in which we exchange on TV
show for another. We use Algorithm-1 that first quantizes the
data using a clustering algorithm (k-means with a Hamming
distance metric) into 25 clusters; then we apply the convex
optimization on the quantized points. The resulting trade-off
curve is depicted in Fig. 10. The curve shows that the quan-
tization step alone introduces an average Hamming distortion
of about 12% (leftmost point on x-axis) per rating, or 6.1
over all 50 shows, and results in a mutual information of
0.189 on the representative points (cluster centers). As this
is still high, we are motivated to apply further distortion. Fig.
10 shows that using the optimal privacy preserving scheme
resulting from convex optimization, we can steadily decrease
the privacy threat with increasing distortion. Not only is our
privacy-distortion curve properly behaved, but small increases
in Hamming distance bring the privacy leakage down quickly.
Moreover, we can achieve perfect privacy (I = 0) at the cost of
an additional 3% in average Hamming distortion (beyond the
clustering distortion). Perfect privacy is achieved at an overall
Hamming Distortion of less than 7 out of 50; put alternatively,
perfect privacy is obtainable if on average we change just less
than 15% of a user’s rating data before it is released.
We next consider the same tradeoff using the version of our
data with the actual ratings. We use k-means clustering with
L2 distance, and the results are given in Fig 11. We cannot
calculate the original mutual information because we do not
know the distribution of actual ratings (the number of unique
rating vectors is too large compared to the size of our data set),
but the mutual information after quantization is 0.182. There
is now a much higher average quantization distortion of 37.5,
or 0.75 per rating, which can be accounted for by the fact that
the range of values for each show is now 0-5 instead of 0 or
1. We see that using the actual ratings requires slightly higher
distortion to reach perfect privacy than with binarized ratings.
In this case, we are able to achieve perfect privacy with an
extra L2 distortion of about 0.05 per rating in average.
Inference defeat: The previous plots show the reduction in
privacy leakage that is achieved by our distortion. Another key
performance metric is to examine how much the accuracy of a
Democrat/Republican classifier is reduced when distorted user
ratings are used instead of the non-distorted ones. We consider
the example of a logistic regression classifier to infer political
affiliation (similar to the one used in [22] to infer gender from
movie ratings). We used 10-fold cross validation on our full
dataset, considered both cases of actual and binarized ratings,
and a distortion that achieves perfect privacy (I = 0). After
perturbing the ratings to reach I = 0, any inference algorithm
cannot perform better than an uninformed guess. In Fig. 12 we
plot the false positive rate, the number of Democrats falsely
classified as Republicans, against the true positive rate, the
number of Republicans who are correctly classified. With a
distortion bound of ∆ = 1, we see that we can significantly
reduce the classifier’s performance but not yet reach perfect
privacy; however with ∆ = 2 the classifier is reduced to
nothing more than an uninformed classifier. This demonstrates
that our approach can indeed successfully render inference
attempts useless.
Finally, note that logistic regression also performs almost
equally well with binarized and actual ratings, which means
merely perturbing existing ratings is not enough. The ad-
versary can ignore the actual rating values, consider only
binarized ratings, and classify almost equally well on whether
or not a user rated a show. Therefore, we must add and/or
delete ratings to protect privacy.
Recommendation quality: As a final performance metric, we
consider the impact of our distortion on the recommendations
that would be produced by a recommender system based on
matrix factorization. RMSE1 captures the root mean squared
error in predicted ratings (compared to the true ratings) using
TABLE I: RMSEs of |r − rˆ| and |r − ˆˆr|
Set 1 2 3 4 5
RMSE1 1.2506 1.1820 1.2461 1.2155 1.2101
RMSE2 1.6972 1.6763 1.6215 1.7248 1.8036
unperturbed data rˆ, while RMSE2 captures the errors when
ratings are predicted using the distorted data ˆˆr produced by our
algorithm. The results are show in Table I, and were produced
using 5-fold cross validation and randomly removing 10% of
the ratings in each test set. We can see that any additional
errors in TV recommendations, introduced by using our dis-
torted version of user ratings, is small. This preliminary result
on the impact on a recommendation system is encouraging,
yet requires further extensive testing.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy
The prevalent notion of privacy adopted by the privacy
research community is differential privacy [23], [24]. In broad
terms, a query over a database is differentially private if small
variations in the entries of the database does not significantly
change the output distribution of the query. This guarantees
that it is difficult to distinguish “neighboring” inputs of the
database based solely on the observation of the output.
Differential privacy does not take into account the distribu-
tion of the entries of the database. This makes the formulation
mathematically tractable and simplifies the implementation of
differentially private systems. Moreover, differential privacy is
robust against arbitrary side information from the attacker (also
called background knowledge or auxiliary information), which
is a property that our mechanism cannot guarantee as such,
even though our recent works seem to suggest great progress
on defining the privacy-utility trade-off under side information.
However, differential privacy does not quantify the amount of
information that is leaked from the system. Furthermore, when
inputs are correlated, guaranteeing differential privacy does not
necessarily guarantee de facto privacy. As shown in [11], an
adversary might able to infer with arbitrarily high precision
the input database of a differentially private query for certain
input distributions.
More general and flexible frameworks similar to differential
privacy exist such as the Pufferfish framework [25]. The basic
idea behind this framework is to output a pair of mutually
exclusive statements, such that the adversary does not know
which, if either, of the two statements is true. This framework
does not take into account or try to minimize distortion of the
data, instead focusing on extracting the data that they wish to
keep private, and ignoring utility preservation. In our paper,
we focus on the privacy-utility trade-off. We also assume,
fairly rigorously, that the adversary has knowledge of the data
generation process, and knows the same a priori distribution
that we do (which is not necessarily the true distribution).
The Pufferfish framework can accommodate any assumption
about the adversary’s knowledge of the a priori distribution,
Initial Cluster Privacy Mapping
N Family Guy NFL Dexter Family Guy NFL Dexter
R FOX News NFL O’Reilly Factor Daily Show NFL Colbert Report
D Daily Show Colbert Report Family Guy NFL Dexter Family Guy
D Daily Show Colbert Report Dexter Daily Show Colbert Report Dexter
N Modern Family The Big bang theory CNN Modern Family The Big bang theory CNN
Fig. 13: Some privacy mappings from clusters to clusters. Each row is a cluster by the 3 most seen TV shows for people
within that cluster. Initially, some cluster may be highly correlated with a political affiliation (denoted by D and R), or may
be more neutral (denoted by N) in the sense that the distribution of democrats and republicans in the cluster is close to the
base distribution in the dataset.
but also requires that we know what the adversary’s belief of
the distribution is, which is not knowledge we can assume.
Another existing trend in the privacy research community
is to apply information-theoretic tools to quantify and design
privacy-preserving mechanisms [11], [26]–[30]. Information
theory provides a natural framework to measure the amount of
private information that an adversary can learn by observing a
given user’s public data. This was first noted by Reed [27], and
has since appeared in different forms in the information theory
and privacy literature. One line of work, adopted in [28], [29],
provides asymptotic and fundamental limits for an adversary’s
average equivocation of the private data as the number of
data samples grows arbitrarily large and characterize rate-
distortion-equivocation regions.
Non-asymptotic approaches to information-theoretic privacy
were discussed, for example, in [11], [26], [30]. In [26],
information-theoretic metrics were directly applied to design
privacy-preserving mechanisms without considering distortion
constraints. Afterwards, [30] presented a formulation for de-
signing privacy-preserving mechanisms similar to the ones
found in rate-distortion theory. More recently, [11] introduced
a general framework for privacy against statistical inference
that takes into account distortion constraints for the user’s
public data.
Information-theoretic approaches have also been used
to quantify the information flow in security systems (e.g.
[31] and the references therein). In this case, different
information-theoretic metrics are used to quantify the change
of an attackers belief of the input of a system given an
observation of the output. These approaches, such as the one
used in [31], also take into account possible prior mismatches
and extra knowledge that an attacker might have. Even though
in this paper we also use information-theoretic metrics to
quantify the change in the attacker’s belief, our results are
fundamentally different in what they seek to accomplish. Our
main goal is not to simply quantify the adversarial threat, but
create a practical framework that allows the design of privacy-
preserving mechanisms that also maintain a certain level of
utility of the data. Therefore, we simultaneously consider the
utility of the data and the variation of the adversary’s belief,
instead of focusing solely on the information flow.
B. Quantization
Data quantization [15] are methods that reduce the size of
datasets. In summary, all of these methods select k represen-
tative examples from the set of n examples, where k ≪ n.
The difference between the methods is in their objectives.
One of the most popular methods is k-means clustering, which
minimizes the mean squared error between the examples and
their closest representative example [15]. Another popular
metric is to minimize is the maximum distance between the
example and its closest representative example. Online k-
center clustering [16] and cover trees [17] find nearly optimal
solutions to this problem.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Privacy attacks are receiving more and more attention, both
from a theoretical perspective, and from a practical point of
view. The amount of information shared everyday, and the
recent improvements in inference models have brought in the
attention of all, the urge for effective yet private systems. This
fundamental contradiction is the core of the privacy problem.
In this paper, we show a practical approach to privacy that has
roots in a deep and strong theoretical framework. We show
that is possible to have private systems by adding a layer
of privacy, without changing the way the data is processed
afterwards, or its purpose. Using techniques from different
fields, such as rate distortion theory, convex optimization,
estimation ,and quantization, we address some challenges
introduced by the diversity and complexity of real world data.
Namely we show that a mismatched prior estimation does
not hurt too much in terms of distortion and privacy leakage.
Moreover, we propose a generic methodology to deal with big
data through quantization. We show that the error in distortion
grows linearly in the quantization error, and that the privacy
leakage is identical.
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